Speaking from the negotiation room at a Swiss resort, US Vice President JD Vance reflected on the complex realities of South Asian diplomacy. Referring to his Indian wife and Pakistan’s Chief of Defence Forces Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir, he remarked: “I have joked that I have two very, very important people in my life — an Indian and a Pakistani. The Indian is my wife, and the Pakistani is Field Marshal Munir.”
Field Marshal Munir’s engagement with senior international figures, including his role alongside Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif in welcoming foreign delegations to Islamabad, has become a visible feature of Pakistan’s expanding diplomatic role, from South Asia to the Middle East.
This trajectory runs counter to India’s efforts to isolate Pakistan following the April 22, 2025 Pahalgam attack. New Delhi reportedly sent 59 politicians to 32 countries to shore up international support, yet Pakistan came out of the four-day war with its regional and international standing intact, and according to some assessments, even stronger. Pakistan’s geographic position, diplomatic networks and security relationships have ensured that Islamabad remains part of critical global conversations despite sustained pressure.
New Delhi’s attempts not only failed diplomatically but also in the information battle as its spun narrative failed to gain traction. During the 2025 standoff, international reporting, and even an Indian naval officer, confirmed that India lost multiple aircraft. Pakistan used the outcome to reinforce its image as a capable actor, able to absorb pressure and impose costs on a larger adversary.
To be sure, the information battle surrounding the crisis became almost as important as the military confrontation. Indian television and social media relentlessly peddled false claims. Karachi Port was supposedly destroyed, Lahore captured and Islamabad was collapsing with Pakistani leaders arrested or hiding.
These claims were widely challenged and created the impression of a narrative campaign driven more by domestic political messaging than by verified information. India attempted to convince the world that the problem lay entirely in Islamabad, but in today’s multipolar environment, most states would not be inclined to choose sides in a South Asian rivalry unless their own interests are at stake.
Geopolitical shifts
China remained Pakistan’s strongest external anchor. Through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, Beijing invested massively in Pakistan’s infrastructure and connectivity. The United States, especially under President Donald Trump, has lauded the positive role played by Field Marshal Munir and Prime Minister Sharif. This backing has given Islamabad additional room to manoeuvre when New Delhi tried to mobilise diplomatic pressure.
South Asia is often treated as though India alone defines the region’s political temperature. But India failed to produce a regional front. The 2024 political shift in Bangladesh signalled Pakistan was expanding its regional options. The reopening of diplomatic channels between Islamabad and Dhaka is an indication that India does not influence the foreign policy choices of neighbouring states. The Bangladesh opening showed that smaller South Asian states, such as Nepal, Sri Lanka and Maldives, stayed cautious and neutral, balancing their interests and external ties with India and China.
Pakistan’s position in the Muslim world remained another source of strength. It maintained solid ties with the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and Gulf Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Iran. These relationships provided Islamabad with diplomatic depth at a time when India was seeking to build international pressure.
Pakistan’s leverage rests on diplomacy, labour ties, energy links, security cooperation and historical associations India cannot easily replicate. Pakistan’s reported Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement with Saudi Arabia in September 2025 added another layer to its value, expanding its Middle East profile. Security cooperation with Ankara bolstered Islamabad’s strategic depth and widened its footing in Europe’s broader neighbourhood, the Black Sea region and Central Asia, areas where India cannot easily compete.
From the Western lens
The United States and Europe refused to fully align with India’s position. Rather than accepting a binary India-versus-Pakistan framing, Western capitals continued to assess Pakistan through the lens of their own priorities.
US-Pakistan trade remained significant in 2025. Goods trade totalled $8.7 billion, US exports to Pakistan at $3.3 billion, imports from Pakistan at $5.4 billion. Washington remained unwilling to discard Pakistan’s utility on Afghanistan, Iran and counter-terrorism for India’s viewpoint.
Similarly, Pakistan and Russia deepened ties and high-level diplomacy, with bilateral trade crossing about $1 billion. In 2026, Moscow reaffirmed cooperation on counter-terrorism, regional stability and economic connectivity.
Financial support from the IMF further buffered against Indian pressure. Economic stabilisation also reduced the possibility that financial vulnerability could be used as a tool of diplomatic isolation. The $7 billion Extended Fund Facility approved in September 2024, followed by successive disbursements in 2025 and 2026, kept Pakistan connected to the global financial system. By May 2026, the IMF Board approved about $1.32 billion in fresh tranches. Remittances reached about $3.59-$3.6 billion in December 2025. Pakistan’s exit from the FATF grey list reduced the possibility of sustained international banking isolation.
India’s efforts backfiring
Despite efforts to frame Pakistan as an international security concern, New Delhi was unable to translate political pressure into broad multilateral action at the UN Security Council. Pakistan’s seat on the UNSC Counter-Terrorism Committee underlined it had not been pushed out of the international system.
Crucially, the Pahalgam crisis revived the Kashmir question, exactly what India wanted to avoid. By attempting to internationalise concerns about Pakistan, India also created renewed international attention around the dispute it has long sought to frame as a purely domestic matter. New Delhi is losing its grip on this dialogue as the world listens to Pakistan. The diplomatic space around Kashmir has therefore become more contested, with references appearing in statements by major international actors despite India’s objections. In response to US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth’s remarks describing growing US-Pakistan cooperation as a “true friendship,” India stated that it expects its partners to press Pakistan to reject cross-border terrorism.
The June 2, 2026, EU-Pakistan joint statement mentioned Kashmir, showing that major powers are willing to acknowledge Pakistan’s stance. India called it “unwarranted,” a reflection perhaps of frustration that it is losing control over the international framing of the issue. Earlier, the China-Pakistan joint statement on Kashmir was issued on May 26. India objected to both the political references and joint projects in the region, but these objections are being increasingly ignored globally.
However, the most striking reversal of India’s isolation strategy has been Pakistan’s emergence as a diplomatic interlocutor. Analysts and regional reporting now describe Islamabad as a “diplomatic darling” courted by the US, China and Middle Eastern players. That is not language Pakistan would have heard from those quarters during a successful isolation drive.
India’s attempt to brand Pakistan a “terrorist state” did not gain traction either. Pakistan has credibly pushed back by pointing out its enormous sacrifices against terrorism since 2001, and the Global Terrorism Index reinforced that Pakistan itself suffered massively from terrorism.
The key takeaway from the post-Pahalgam period is that isolation strategies are difficult to sustain in a fragmented international order. States with strategic geography, security relevance, economic connections and multiple diplomatic partnerships cannot easily be pushed aside. India sought to narrow Pakistan’s options, but instead, the campaign revealed why Pakistan remains too strategically important to be sidelined.
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