In a recent video report, German state broadcaster Deutsche Welle News observed that “more than two decades after 9/11, Al Qaeda hasn’t vanished, it’s adapted.”
This assessment is reinforced by recent reports from the world’s leading news outlets, including the Wall Street Journal and Al Jazeera, which indicate that one of Al Qaeda’s regional affiliates, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), is on the verge of capturing the Malian capital, Bamako.
Operating across the Sahel region of West Africa, primarily in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, JNIM is imposing an economic siege on the capital by blocking routes used by fuel tankers, effectively bringing the country to a standstill.
Despite the elimination or arrest of its top to mid-ranking leadership in the Afghanistan-Pakistan (Af-Pak) region over the last two decades — through extensive US-led counter-terrorism operations across Af-Pak, the Middle East and Africa — Al Qaeda has persisted by adopting a key strategy: evolving from a hierarchical, centralised organisational structure to a decentralised network of franchises.
More than two decades after 9/11, Al Qaeda hasn’t vanished — it’s adapted. As one of its regional affiliates brings Mali’s capital to a standstill and another, Al Shabaab, regains ground in Somalia, extremist networks are once again touting the establishment of Islamic emirates…
These franchises have been granted operational autonomy while adhering to Al Qaeda Central’s (AQC) general ideology. This strategic shift has enabled the group to maintain its influence and continue its operations, even in the face of significant leadership losses.
Apart from JNIM, Al Shabaab — another formidable Al-Qaeda affiliate — currently controls significant portions of southern and central Somalia, as of November 2025. The group has recently regained ground, reversing many of the territorial losses incurred during the Somali government’s 2022-2023 counter-offensive.
Recently, a number of encrypted extremist channels, known for sharing propaganda from the Az-Zallaqah Foundation — the official media and propaganda arm of JNIM — featured one common written commentary with a bold prediction. “It seems that before the end of this year, the jihadists will have an Islamic state or emirate, either in Mali, Somalia or both.”
THE EVOLUTION OF AFFILLIATES
These developments are not isolated incidents, but rather part of a broader extremist context and trend. The Taliban takeover of Afghanistan has proven to be a key catalyst, ideologically inspiring and operationally emboldening extremist groups — including regional entities such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and global networks like Al Qaeda — to pursue territorial control.
Al Qaeda is now predominantly managed by its affiliates, while its central leadership remains largely restricted to issuing general directives. Following the assassination of its second top leader, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, the organisation has been unable to formally announce his successor.
The first affiliate, Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), was established in 2004, followed by Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in 2006-2007 in North Africa and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in 2009.
Al Shabaab, recognised as Al-Qaeda’s most affluent affiliate, with reported estimated annual revenue exceeding $100 million, emerged in 2012. Subsequently, Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) was formed in September 2014, and JNIM, which includes AQIM and four Malian armed groups, was established in 2017. Additionally, Hurras al-Din (HAD) surfaced in Syria in early 2018.
Among the affiliates mentioned above, several have either gradually become completely defunct, merged with others, or dissolved. For instance, AQIM merged with JNIM, HAD was declared dissolved by Al-Qaeda, while AQI evolved into the Islamic State (IS). The split between Al Qaeda and the IS became official in February 2014, when Al-Qaeda publicly disavowed any relationship with the IS. It came after months of tension between the two groups, sparked by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s refusal to follow directives from Al Qaeda’s central command led by Ayman al-Zawahiri, on ideological, operational and organisational matters.
The most intriguing case in our region is the Al Qaeda branch, AQIS, which was once responsible for nearly all significant attacks against key security installations throughout Pakistan, alongside the TTP. AQIS also played a crucial role in supporting the TTP in ideological, operational and propaganda efforts, but it is now primarily limited to disseminating propaganda content and is operationally inactive.
IMPACT OF THE DOHA PEACE AGREEMENT
Analysts maintain that AQC and AQIS have become the primary casualties of the US-Taliban Doha peace agreement in 2020, as a key condition of the deal is to prevent Al Qaeda from using Afghan soil to “threaten the security of the United States and its allies.”
As a result of these bilateral arrangements, AQC is even unable to acknowledge the death of its leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul in July 2022 or to announce his successor formally, while AQIS’s operations have completely disappeared.
The Doha Agreement created a paradox for Al Qaeda, explains Riccardo Valle, my colleague and head of research at The Khorasan Diary, a digital platform focusing on extremist groups and conflict. “It achieved their primary goal of empowering the Taliban in Afghanistan, but it also forced AQC and AQIS to adopt a low profile, to avoid provoking the Americans,” he continues. “This has led AQIS to redirect its focus to Pakistan, supporting the Pakistani Taliban’s campaign against the state, often under the guise of new alliances.”
A RESILIENT THREAT
Al Qaeda has modified its operational tactics and organisational structure, yet its core ideology remains intact. The group seems to be refraining from executing major attacks, especially in the West, to avoid repercussions and to allow its territorial expansion in East and West Africa to continue unhindered.
This strategic patience distinguishes Al Qaeda from the Islamic State’s approach in 2014-2017, when the latter simultaneously pursued territorial control while conducting high-profile international attacks — a strategy that ultimately drew overwhelming military response and territorial collapse.
Reports suggest that the General Directorate of Intelligence (GDI), the intelligence service of the Afghan Taliban, has a dedicated section for managing foreign terrorist entities in Afghanistan, including Al Qaeda. These entities are allegedly provided with security, accommodations, a monthly stipend and, in certain cases, even nationalities. Tajmir Jawad, the deputy director of GDI, is reportedly responsible for overseeing these foreign groups, primarily Al Qaeda, in Afghanistan.
If one conducts even a basic investigation, a fundamental factor would emerge as the principal reason for the rise and growth of all these Al Qaeda affiliates within their respective countries: weak states struggling with issues such as foreign intervention, inadequate governance, political exclusion, ongoing conflicts, and economic disparities, all of which provide a conducive environment for militant organisations to thrive.
With a robust ideological framework, these groups try to position themselves before the masses as an alternative to the current ruling class, which has not adequately addressed the people’s grievances over the years.
Although Al Qaeda’s central leadership may be weakened, its influence is expanding within the extremist landscape, as the territorial strength of its affiliates continues to grow across various regions, presenting a significant threat. These affiliates, which share strong ideological alignment with AQC but operate with a degree of autonomy, will furnish Al Qaeda’s core leadership with new avenues for funding, recruitment and operational bases, thereby allowing it to sustain a global presence.
A significant development in recent years has been the international acceptance and de facto diplomatic recognition of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, along with the formal diplomatic recognition and warm reception of the Ahmed Al-Sharaa-led government in Syria on the world stage (Al-Sharaa was once a member of AQI and headed the Al Qaeda-affiliated al-Nusra front). This may have established a precedent for Al Qaeda, suggesting that, if it were to seize control of a country, it could seek the same recognition and acceptance from the international community.
Such a scenario could prompt Al Qaeda to adopt a strategy that merges warfare with political manoeuvring to fulfil its objectives, rather than resorting to confrontation as it did after the 9/11 attacks.
The writer is an Islamabad-based journalist and co-founder of
The Khorasan Diary. X: @IhsanTipu
Published in Dawn, EOS, November 16th, 2025
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